A Quick WITTgenstein; Fast TRACtatus Philosophical Investigations

Ludwig Wittgenstein is known for his contributions to the fields of logic, language, and the philosophy of mind, as well as psychology, linguistics, and computer science. He developed a new approach to philosophy that emphasized the role of language and language-use in shaping our understanding of the world.

The "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus" and the "Philosophical Investigations" are two distinct works by Ludwig Wittgenstein that represent different stages in his philosophical development. The "Tractatus" is Wittgenstein's early work, which was published in 1921. It is a series of seven propositions that attempt to describe the relationship between language, thought, and the world. Wittgenstein's early work, the "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus," was highly influential in the development of logical positivism and the Vienna Circle. This work argued that the world consists of simple, indivisible facts that cannot be further reduced or analyzed, and that the structure of language reflects the structure of the world. His later work, the "Philosophical Investigations," which was published in 1953 after his death, marked a significant shift in his philosophy. In this work, Wittgenstein rejected many of the ideas that he had developed in the "Tractatus," and he argued that language is a flexible and context-dependent tool that is used in different ways depending on the context in which it is used.

The "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus" is a series of seven propositions that attempt to describe the relationship between language, thought, and the world.

In Proposition 1, Wittgenstein asserts that the world consists of facts, and that these facts are represented by atomic propositions. He argues that the world is the sum total of all that exists, and that it is independent of our thoughts and perceptions of it. This proposition serves as the foundation for the rest of the "Tractatus," and it establishes the concept of the "atomic fact" as the basic unit of reality.

In Proposition 2, Wittgenstein introduces the concept of the "atomic fact," which he defines as the basic unit of reality. He argues that the world is made up of simple, indivisible facts that cannot be further reduced or analyzed. This proposition builds on the first proposition by specifying that the world consists of atomic facts, which are the fundamental building blocks of reality.

In Proposition 3, Wittgenstein introduces the concept of the "picture theory of meaning," which states that a proposition is a picture of a possible state of affairs, and that the structure of the proposition mirrors the structure of the state of affairs that it represents. He argues that the structure of language reflects the structure of the world, and that the meaning of a proposition is determined by the possible states of affairs that it represents. This proposition establishes the relationship between language, thought, and the world, and it introduces the idea that the structure of language reflects the structure of reality.

In Proposition 4, Wittgenstein asserts that a thought is a significant proposition, which is one that represents a possible state of affairs. He argues that the meaning of a proposition is determined by the logical relations that it bears to other propositions, and that these logical relations are expressed through the structure of the proposition itself. This proposition expands on the third proposition by specifying that a thought is a significant proposition, which is one that has meaning because it represents a possible state of affairs.

In Proposition 5, Wittgenstein introduces the concept of the "truth-function," which is a logical operation that combines the truth-values of individual propositions to form a new proposition. He argues that propositions are constructed from elementary propositions (the atomic facts) through the application of truth-functions. This proposition specifies the logical structure of propositions, and it introduces the idea that propositions are constructed from simpler building blocks through the application of logical operations.

In Proposition 6, Wittgenstein gives the general form of a proposition as [p, ξ, N(ξ)], where p is the propositional variable, ξ is the variable that ranges over the elementary propositions, and N(ξ) is the function that determines the truth-value of the proposition. He argues that this form captures the logical structure of any proposition. This proposition provides a more formal specification of the logical structure of propositions, and it introduces the concept of the propositional variable as a way to represent the logical structure of propositions.

In Proposition 7, Wittgenstein concludes the "Tractatus" with the famous phrase "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent." He argues that there are certain things that cannot be expressed through language, and that we must remain silent about them.

In the "Philosophical Investigations," Wittgenstein introduces and develops several key ideas that have had a significant impact on the field of philosophy. In "Philosophical Investigations," he introduces the concept of "language-games," which refers to the various ways in which language is used in different contexts. He also argues that the structure of language reflects the structure of the world, and that our understanding of the world is mediated through the use of language. Wittgenstein argues that language is not a fixed system of signs with fixed meanings, but rather a flexible tool that is used in different ways depending on the context in which it is used. For example, the word "red" might refer to a particular color when used in the context of describing the color of an object, but it might have a completely different meaning when used in the context of a traffic light or a stop sign. In these cases, the word "red" is being used in a different language-game, and it has a different meaning within that context.

He suggests that the meaning of a word or phrase is not determined by its definition, but rather by its role in the language-game in which it is used. This idea challenges traditional views of language, which often assume that the meaning of a word is fixed and independent of its context. Wittgenstein's concept of language-games suggests that language is a dynamic and context-dependent tool, and that the meaning of a word or phrase depends on how it is used within a particular language-game.

Another important concept in the "Philosophical Investigations" is the idea of "family resemblance." Wittgenstein argues that words and concepts do not have fixed, essential definitions, but rather that they are connected to one another through a network of overlapping similarities, or "family resemblances." For example, the concept of "game" might include activities such as chess, football, and Monopoly, which have some similarities but also significant differences. These activities might be connected to one another through a network of overlapping similarities, such as the fact that they involve competition, rules, and an element of chance, but they do not share a single, essential definition that defines what makes something a "game."

Wittgenstein also discusses the concept of "private language," which refers to a hypothetical language that is used by a single individual and that cannot be shared or understood by others. Wittgenstein argues that a private language is not possible, because language relies on shared meanings and the use of words to represent those meanings. Without the possibility of communication and shared understanding, language would not be able to fulfill its purpose.

Wittgenstein discusses the concept of "ostensive definition," which refers to the use of gestures or examples to demonstrate the meaning of a word or concept. He argues that ostensive definitions are not sufficient on their own to determine the meaning of a word, and that they must be used in conjunction with other language-games in order to convey meaning. (how we are taught as children when a teacher points at an object makes a sound and we repeat the sound/word; a very basic and limited understanding of the objects the sound/word is indicating)

Wittgenstein discusses the concept of "rule-following," which refers to the way in which we use and follow rules in language and other activities. He suggests that the meaning of a rule is not determined by its definition, but rather by its use in a particular context. He also argues that there is a distinction between following a rule "meaningfully" and following it "mechanically," and that the meaning of a rule depends on how it is followed in a particular context.

Wittgenstein discusses the concept of "truth," and the relationship between language and truth. He suggests that the truth of a proposition is determined by its correspondence to reality, and that the meaning of a proposition is determined by the way in which it is used in a language-game. He also argues that there is a distinction between "saying" something and "showing" something, and that certain aspects of reality cannot be expressed through language. There is an example he gave concerning how something can make enough sense to mmm as for us to get the idea of what is being talked about, but technically is illogical nonsense. The example of "the blade of Excaliber broke". Even though we can with a bit of confidence understand the meaning behind the sentence, it's actually an illogical sentence. For the blade, hilt, etc in combination makes up Excaliber, so the sentence "Excaliber broke" would be one that follows logic. There are other interesting points he brings up about the borders of language and it's lack there of when concerning certain things. Take counting for instance, if a man is able to count to ten, there is no definitive border or indicator that he can either keep counting, or not be able to keep counting. "Am I therefore to assume he can count to 100? And if so, what about 1,000, or even up to 1,000,000?" That in some instances, language hasn't evolved enough for us to answer certain questions we are asking of it.

To recap and summerize, the key difference between the "Tractatus" and the "Philosophical Investigations" is the way in which they approach the relationship between language and the world. In the "Tractatus," Wittgenstein argues that the structure of language reflects the structure of the world, and that the meaning of a proposition is determined by the possible states of affairs that it represents. In contrast, in the "Philosophical Investigations," Wittgenstein suggests that the meaning of a word or concept is not determined by its definition or by a set of necessary and sufficient conditions, but rather by its use in a language-game.

As far as what we can take away from Wittgenstein's philosophy and apply it in our current lives is the idea that language is a flexible and context-dependent tool that is used in different ways depending on the context in which it is used. This idea challenges traditional views of language, which often assume that the meaning of a word is fixed and independent of its context. Wittgenstein's concept of language-games suggests that we should be mindful of the ways in which language is used in different contexts, and that we should be careful not to make assumptions about the meaning of words based on their definitions alone. I would argue that especially in the current world landscape, where people's egocentric, emotional interpretations of stimuli gives rise to the constant state of assuming the personal emotional value they've attached to a word, object, or experience, must be the same significance and value perceived by the other person; right?!? (hopefully my heavy blatent sarcasm was obvious) Wittgenstein has shown that even at the most basic level, our language and the definitions and value of significance assigned to events, people, and objects, are very different. By the time we attempt to cover any hot button issue, or deep philosophical concept, we aren't even in the ballpark of talking about the same thing. Yet how many wars and arguments have been started over the years because assumptions of perspective were made instead of trying to ask each other enough questions to make sure our individual perception's interpretation of said stimulus' were anywhere close to the other person's perspective? Our fragile ego identifies with emotional arguments, trying to feel important, and therefore instead of staying logically nuetral, it takes a disagreeing opinion from someone else, as a personal attack on them, rather than thinking it through and realizing the other person may have a completely different interpretation of a thing/item/object's (words in general) value and meaning. Language is constantly changing and growing and unfortunately has also been politicized to put citizens against one another so we fight amongst ourselves while they pass the laws and pull the strings. Communication is key; always ask a question before making an assumption.

Wittgenstein's unique perspective on language, it's limitations, and it's role in society, were not only an important philosophical addition, but also in thought in academia and intellectual progress in general. As well as other fields concerning everything from logic, math, and engineering, and communication to physical activities like martial arts. It's sometimes the case that the missing piece of the puzzle In your field of study may actually come from outside of the field in general. I believe Wittgenstein's work gave us new eyes

to see what was hidden in front of us all along and for me personally, was a top ten life changing experience; paradigm shattering. I would encourage anyone to take the plunge as well; the world won't look the same after.

To conclude this, I will leave you with some of my favorite Wittgenstein quotes.

"That it doesn’t strike us at all when we look around us, move about in space, feel our own bodies, etc. etc., shows how natural these things are to us. We do not notice that we see space perspectivally or that our visual field is in some sense blurred towards the edges. It doesn’t strike us and never can strike us because it is the way we perceive. We never give it a thought and it’s impossible we should, since there is nothing that contrasts with the form of our world.What I wanted to say is it’s strange that those who ascribe reality only to things and not to our ideas move about so unquestioningly in the world as idea and never long to escape from it."

"If we take eternity to mean not infinite temporal duration but timelessness, then eternal life belongs to those who live in the present."

"If anyone is unwilling to descend into himself, because this is too painful, he will remain superficial in his writing. . . If I perform to myself, then it’s this that the style expresses. And then the style cannot be my own. If you are unwilling to know what you are, your writing is a form of deceit."

"If in life we are surrounded by death, then in the health of our intellect we are surrounded by madness."

"Man feels the urge to run up against the limits of language. Think for example of the astonishment that anything at all exists. This astonishment cannot be expressed in the form of a question, and there is also no answer whatsoever. Anything we might say is a prioribound to be nonsense. Nevertheless we do run up against the limits of language. Kierkegaard too saw that there is this running up against something, and he referred to it in a fairly similar way (as running up against paradox). This running up against the limits of language is ethics."

"Our craving for generality has [as one] source … our preoccupation with the method of science. I mean the method of reducing the explanation of natural phenomena to the smallest possible number of primitive natural laws; and, in mathematics, of unifying the treatment of different topics by using a generalization. Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes, and are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer in the way science does. This tendency is the real source of metaphysics, and leads the philosopher into complete darkness. I want to say here that it can never be our job to reduce anything to anything, or to explain anything. Philosophy really is “purely descriptive"

"The aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden because of their simplicity and familiarity. (One is unable to notice something because it is always before one’s eyes.) The real foundations of his enquiry do not strike a man at all"

"There is a truth in Schopenhauer’s view that philosophy is an organism, and that a book on philosophy, with a beginning and end, is a sort of contradiction. … In philosophy matters are not simple enough for us to say ‘Let’s get a rough idea’, for we do not know the country except by knowing the connections between the roads."